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Introduction 
 
This paper focuses on the Viet Nam Phuc Quoc Quan (National Restoration 
Army of Vietnam)1, which staged an armed insurrection in Dong Dang and 
Lang Son in September 1940, when the Japanese Army was stationing 
forces in northern French Indochina, and on its parent organization, the 
Viet Nam Phuc Quoc Dong Minh Hoi ( League for the National Restoration 
of Vietnam). Throughout the paper, the emphasis will be placed on their 
relationship with Japan. 
 There have been very few serious and in-depth academic studies on 
the insurrection itself and the activities of the Phuc Quoc League.2 There 
are several good reasons for this. First, in outlining the political history of 
Vietnam in the 1930s and 1940s, it has been conventional to focus on the 
activities of the Dong Duong Cong San Dang (Indochinese Communist 
Party), while treating the activities of the Phuc Quoc League as marginal, 
                                                  
1 Although Cuong De‘s memoirs (see note 5) call it the “Viet Nam Kien Quoc Quan” 
(Nation-Building Army of Vietnam”, this paper follows the more commonly used nomenclature 
among researchers: the “Viet Nam Phuc Quoc Quan” (National Restoration Army of Vietnam). 
2 This is not to say that they have been totally neglected by researchers. 
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and moreover to condemn the League as a puppet of Japan.3 There is no 
denying that the Communist Party and various organizations affiliated 
with it played the pivotal role in carrying out the 1945 August Revolution, 
and have continued to occupy the central place in the country’s political life. 
It is also true that, objectively speaking, the Phuc Quoc League and the 
people involved in it had very close and special relations with the Japanese. 
Even if this is correct, however, it seems necessary to record and sort out 
what actually happened. Given, moreover, the fact that the Phuc Quoc 
Army’s insurrection may have produced some effects, both positive and 
negative, on the political situation in Vietnam at the time, it does not 
appear to be totally meaningless to analyze it. It concerns the history of 
Vietnam’s internal politics and national liberation movements. 
 A second reason for the lack of full-fledged research on the Phuc 
Quoc League and Army is because the insurrection itself, having been 
smashed so quickly and easily, tended to be regarded as merely one episode 
in the process of the Japanese Army’s southward advance. Nevertheless, the 
incident is worthy of attention as it set the pattern, or presented a prototype 
model, for Japanese reactions toward political activities undertaken by the 
Vietnamese until the end of the Pacific War, and Japan’s plan for governing 
Indochina.4 It can also be seen as a concrete example of what Japan’s 
                                                  
3 As early as in November 1940, at its Seventh Meeting, the Indochinese Communist Party’s 
Central Committee criticized the Phuc Quoc League for being a Japanese puppet. Tran Huy Lieu 
(1960) p. 48 and note 1. Not surprisingly, present-day Vietnamese historians are of the same view. 
See, for example, Tran Huy Lieu (1960) pp. 21-22; Tran Van Giau (1963) pp. 52-53; and Hong 
Chuong (1962). This view is also shared by researchers in the West, including the United States. 
See, for example, Duiker (1976) pp. 256-57, and 262. 
4 For an overview of Japanese policy toward French Indochina in 1940-45, see Shiraishi and 
Furuta (1977). Since the original version of this paper was published in Japanese in 1982, a 
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southward advance was really about. These issues pertain to Japan’s 
relations with Vietnam and the Southern Area in general. 
 A third reason for the lack of attention given to the activities of the 
Phuc Quoc League and its affiliate groups is the fact that insufficient efforts 
have been made to discover and use pertinent documents. Even the 
memoirs of former members of the League have not been put to use 
effectively.5 What is more, primarily because of the language barrier, many 
researchers (mostly Vietnamese and Western) remain unaware of pertinent 
documents in Japanese. Fortunately, the author is in a position to conduct 
interviews with Japanese people who were involved in or knowledgeable 
about the activities of the Phuc Quoc League and its Army, and also to make 
use of the Japanese literature on the state of affairs that surrounded the 
Phuc Quoc’s activities as well as the Japanese army’s movements around 
                                                                                                                                                
number of books and articles concerning the topic have been published by the author himself and 
other researchers. Among them are Shiraishi (1982); Shiraishi (1984); Shiraishi (1985); Shiraishi 
(1986); Yoshizawa (1986); and Tachikawa (2000). 
5 The following two memoirs are especially important, and will be referred to by their acronyms 
for convenience’s sake: 
CD -- Cuong De (1957). According to a preface written by Tung Lam (or Matsubayashi in 
Japanese), Matsubayashi, a newspaper reporter, interviewed Cuong De for several hours each 
day from December 12 to 18, 1943, and the transcribed manuscript was looked over by Cuong 
De before it was sent to the press. In other words, the book, which takes the form of an 
autobiography, was based on a transcript of interviews (phong van ky). According to another 
preface signed by Cuong De’s eldest son Trang Liet, when he and his younger brother came to 
Japan after the Pacific War to receive the remains of their father (who passed away in Tôkyô in 
1951), they also brought back to Vietnam their father’s belongings, including a transcript of the 
interviews, which had already been translated into Vietnamese by the Phuc Quoc League’s 
Publicity Team (based in Tôkyô). Trang Liet published it in Sai Gon in 1957. 
As a matter of fact, Cuong De refers to himself in the text by the first person pronoun “I” (bi 
nhan). The book contains a number of facts known only to Cuong De himself, and its 
descriptions are deemed reliable because they are in accord with the accounts offered in the 
memoirs of Phan Boi Chau (1957) and Tran Trong Khac (1971), as well as the accounts offered 
in the memoir of Hoang Nam Huug (1959) mentioned below. Given these facts, the book can 
justifiably be regarded as a memoir dictated by Cuong De himself. 
HNH – Hoang Nam Huug, (1959). The author wrote this memoir after having read those of 
Cuong De (1957) and Phan Boi Chau (1957). 
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the time of their advance into northern French Indochina.6 Consulting 
these Japanese documents side by side with Vietnamese documents can 
enable us to overcome, to a considerable extent, the shortage of pertinent 
documents that has long hindered the progress of research in this field. 
 To sum up the foregoing observations, this paper has a four-fold 
purpose. 
       First, it is an attempt to reconstruct the development of the 
activities of the Phuc Quoc League and its Army by comparatively 
examining Vietnamese, Japanese and other documents.  
Second, it probes into the true state of Japan’s involvement in 
Vietnamese nationalist movements during the period when Japanese troops  
advanced into northern French Indochina. 
Third, it tries to assess the effects or repercussions of the Phuc 
Quoc’s activities on the political situation in Vietnam at the time. 
And fourth, it also presents the author’s own views on the following 
two conflicting hypotheses that have been presented on the relationship 
between the Phuc Quoc people and the Japanese military authorities. One 
                                                  
6 Major sources of reference in the form of pulished books are Bôeichô Senshishitsu, ed. (1973); 
Bôeichô Senshishitsu, ed. (1975); Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai ed. (1963); Kajima Heiwa 
Kenkyûjo ed. (1973); Nihon Kindai Shiryô Kenkyûkai ed. (1971); Satô (1966); and Maruyama 
(1950). 
Unpublished documents in the following archival files are also quite important: 
MHO file-- “Futsuin Mondai Keii Tsuzuri” (File on the Developments of the French 
Indochinese? Question) housed in the Bôeichô Senshishitsu (Japan Defense Agency Military 
History Office);  
DRO file--“Futsukoku Naisei Kankei Zassan, Zokuryô Kankei, Indoshina Kankei, Annan 
Ôzoku Honpô Bômei Kankei” (A Collection of Miscellaneous Articles Concerning French 
Internal Politics/ Overseas Possessions/ Indochina/ Members of the Annamese Royal Family in 
Exile in Japan) housed in the Gaimushô Gaikô Shiryôkan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 
Diplomatic Record Office). 
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hypothesis, supported by Vietnamese researchers including Tran Huy Lieu,7 
and John T. McAlister, Jr.,8 maintains that the Phuc Quoc Army staged the 
insurrection under the patronage of the Japanese military authorities. 
Other researchers such as Milton Sacks9 and Phillipe Devillers10 also 
strongly suggest that the Phuc Quoc Army must have been organized with 
the backing of the Japanese army. By contrast, Truong Buu Lam of the 
University of Hawaii rejects this view, reasoning instead that the Phuc 
Quoc Army must have staged the insurrection on its own initiative, and 
independently from the activities of the Japanese forces.11 The author sides 
with the former view, for reasons expressed in the concluding section of this 
paper, where Lam’s hypothesis is critically examined. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. Section I describes the 
circumstances that led to the establishment of the Phuc Quoc League. 
Section II deals with the establishment of a Vietnamese broadcasting team 
by the Government-General of Taiwan, and the Phuc Quoc League’s 
involvement in the team. Section III describes the Phuc Quoc Army’s 
insurrection. The concluding section attempts to characterize the 
relationship between the Japanese military and the Phuc Quoc League, and 
the Japanese army’s maneuvers toward the Vietnamese nationalist 
movement, while also probing into the relationship between the Phuc Quoc 
Army’s insurrection and the political situation in Vietnam. 
                                                  
7 The Japanese translation (1970) pp.273-274 of Tran Huy Lieu et al. (1957). 
8 McAlister (1969) p. 119. 
9 Sacks (1949) pp. 50-51. 
10 Devillers (1952) p. 78. 
11 Truong Buu Lam (1973) pp. 244-45. 
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I. The Vietnamese Phuc Quoc League 
 
(1) Cuong De's Activities in Exile By 1937 
The Vietnamese Phuc Quoc League, or League for the National Restoration 
of Vietnam, was established in 1939 in Shanghai under the leadership of 
Cuong De. 
 Born in Hue in 1882 into the royal family, Cuong De became the head 
of the Viet Nam Duy Tan Hoi (Society for the Renovation of Vietnam) at the 
recommendation of Phan Boi Chau, a well-known leader of the nationalist 
movement. In 1906 he traveled to Japan and joined the Dong Du Movement 
(Movement for Studying Abroad in Japan)12 which had been organized by 
Phan Boi Chau. Following the movement’s collapse, Cuong De left Japan in 
1909. However, he returned there in 1915 after roaming to many places 
including China, Siam and Europe.13  
After he came back to Japan in 1915, according to his own 
recollections, Cuong De took up his residence in Tôkyô ’s Ômori Ward, and 
frequently visited Inukai Tsuyoshi and his right-hand man, Kashiwabara 
Buntarô, both of whom had supported Vietnamese in Japan since the days 
of the Dong Du Movement.  
 
                                                  
12 For an overview of the Dong Du (Studying Abroad in Japan) Movement, see Marr, (1971) ch. 6. 
Since the original Japanese version of this paper was printed, the author has also published 
Shiraishi (1993) which is a comprehensive study on Phan Boi Chau and his movement during the 
Dong Du period. 
13 CD, p. 94ff 
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It is reported, in particular, that in the period from 1915 to his 
assassination in May 1932, Inukai provided Cuong De with a monthly 
stipend, whose amount was 100 yen at the beginning but was raised to 150 
yen in the latter half of the period. The stipend was used to cover the living 
expenses of Cuong De and other Vietnamese residents. Cuong De makes 
mention of seven Vietnamese who were residing in Japan in 1915, including 
Tran Huu Cong and Tran Van An. They were attending schools in Japan, 
and pretending to be Chinese.14 Cuong De used the Chinese name of Lin De 
Shun (pronounced Rin Toku Jun in Japanese) and the Japanese name of 
Minami Kazuo.15  
After Inukai’s assassination, the financial aid seems to have come 
mainly from Matsui Iwane and his group. A pan-Asianist and a doyen of the 
army, Matsui was so deeply interested in Vietnam that he visited French 
Indochina himself in July 1943, declaring to the local press that “regardless 
of the wishes of Britain and the United States, Japan is determined to 
liberate Asian nations.”16 Matsui organized a group named “Kissaragi-Kai” 
(February Society), which was joined by military officers under his influence 
and members of the Kokuryû-Kai (Black Dragon Society), to give spiritual 
and financial support to Cuong De and his group.17 Kisaragi-Kai seems to 
                                                  
14 CD, pp. 95 and 126-127. The financial support from Inukai and Kashiwabara is corroborated by 
reports of the Japanese and French authorities contained in the DRO file. 
15 CD, p. 94 and various documents contained in the above-mentioned DRO file. According to 
some documents in the DRO file, communications from the French Embassy in Tôkyô in 1919 
and 1925 cited that Cuong De was using the Japanese name “Takamatsu.” 
16 Devillers (1952) pp. 88-89. 
17 Interviews with Mr. Hayashi Hidezumi; and Individual A (Japanese who wishes to remain 
anonymous). 
 8
have begun providing aid to Cuong De’s group by the end of the 1930s.18 
During the Pacific War, Matsui is also reported to have offered a house in 
Sakura Jôsui, Tôkyô, that could accommodate about 10 people, for use by 
Vietnamese students and politicians in exile.19 
In addition to Matsui, people like Tôyama Mitsuru, Ôkawa Shûmei, 
and Inukai Takeru also seem to have supported Cuong De’s group in some 
way or other.20 
 Upon his return to Japan in 1915, Cuong De judged that in the wake 
of the end of the First World War he could not expect to muster support for 
                                                  
18 According to an interview with Mr. Tsuchiya Yonekichi, when he met Cuong De for the first 
time in Tôkyô in April 1939 or thereabouts, Cuong De and his group were under the protection 
of people affiliated with Matsui Iwane’s “Asian League” (Ajia Renmei). 
19 Interview with Individual B (Vietnamese who wishes to remain anonymous). 
20 On personal contacts between Tôyama Mitsuru and Cuong De, HNH, pp. 170-171 points out that 
when Hoang Nam Hung visited Japan in 1932, he was introduced to Tôyama by Cuong De. See 
also the letter dated June 28, 1926 from the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Vice-Minister 
of Home Affairs, and the letter dated April 10, 1929 from the Chief of the Tôkyô Metropolitan 
Police Department to the Minister of Home Affairs, both included in the DRO file.  
Information on personal contacts between Ôkawa Shûmei and Cuong De is based on the 
author’s interview with Individual B.  
Also, Komatsu (1955) p. 212 points out that the two “prominent rightists”, Tôyama Mitsuru 
and Ôkawa Shûmei, are “reportedly among the influential supporters of Cuong De,” along with 
“General Matsui Iwane, believer of Greater East Asianism.” The above-mentioned book’s author, 
Komatsu Kiyoshi, himself stayed in Indochina during the 1940s, having close relations with a 
mumber of Vietnamese intellectuals and political figures there who had some contacts with 
Cuong De’s group in Tôkyô. 
For the relationship between Tran Van An (or Tran Phuc An), a very close associate of Cuong 
De, and the organ of Gyôchisha, one of the political organizations established by Ôkawa, and 
between Tran Van An and Nishida Mitsugi, see Matsumoto (1975), p. 96ff.  
Information on personal contact between Inukai Takeru and Cuong De is based on the author’s 
interview with Mr. Tsuchiya Yonekichi. It should be added that Inukai Takeru visited French 
Indochina in April 1934 in connection with the Kagesa Agency’s intrigues toward Wang 
Zhaoming, and during his stay there he obtained cooperation from several people who would 
later have intimate relationships with Cuong De, such as Kadomatsu Shôichi, a member of 
Section Eight (Covert Operations) of the General Staff Office, who was staying in French 
Indochina in 1938 and 1939 (based on the author’s interview with Mr.Kadomatsu himself), and 
Yamane Dôichi and Ômiya Komaki, both employees of Taiwan Takushoku (Colonization) 
Corporation. See Maruyama (1950). p. 95. 
Aside from the people mentioned above, Matsushita Mitsuhiro, president of Dainan Kôshi 
(Corporation), also had been in contact with Cuong De since before the beginning of the Pacific 
War, apparently playing a role primarily in intermediating between Cuong De and various groups 
within Vietnam (based on the author’s interviews with Mr. Matsushita himself). 
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his revolutionary activities from within Japan, and he moved temporarily to 
China in 1918. While there, he and Phan Boi Chau jointly conceived of 
establishing an operational base in Hangzhou, and tried to talk Duan Qirui 
of the Beijing government into financially supporting their plan. When this 
effort to raise funds failed, Cuong De returned to Japan during the same 
year.21 For some time thereafter, he remained in Japan, but toward the end 
of March 1922, he dispatched Tan Anh, who had come to Japan to ask him 
for help, to Sai Gon on a mission to stir up Vietnamese youths within the 
country to smuggle themselves out of the country and into China.  
In August of the same year, Cuong De himself visited Guangzhou. 
Although his plan to summon youths from Vietnam to China failed, he 
remained in Guangzhou for more than a year until toward the end of 
September 1923, when he visited Hangzhou, meeting Phan Boi Chau again. 
Subsequently, he tried in vain to draw financial support from the warlords 
of Luoyang, and then returned to Japan.22 
 It becomes clear from the foregoing facts that Cuong De, while 
primarily settling in Japan, repeatedly visited China, trying to draw funds 
                                                  
21 CD, pp. 98-100. Phan Boi Chau in his memoirs (1957) makes no mention of the fact that he 
stayed in Beijing and tried to raise funds together with Cuong De. However, the book does 
mention that he stayed in Japan for three months in 1917 (ibid., pp. 173-180), and this visit may 
have had something to do with Cuong De’s trip to China the following year. To add in passing, 
Phan Boi Chau visited Japan again in around 1920-21 (ibid., p. 191). 
22 CD, pp. 108-116. The letter dated June 30, 1925 from the Chief of the Ministry of Home Affairs’ 
Police Bureau to the Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Treaties Bureau, which is 
contained in the DRO file, points out that Lin De Shun (Rin Toku Jun in Japanese pronunciation?, 
the pseudonym of Cuong De, entered Japan in 1915, studied for a time at Waseda niversity with 
financial support of the late General Fukushima, and headed for Shanghai in October 1922. This 
document thus confirms his 1922 trip to China. Similarly, other documents in the same archival 
records point out that on January 31, 1924 he entered the Second Dormitory for Chinese Students 
(Dai-ni Chûka Gakusha) on the pretext that he was from Guangdong Province studying at the 
Medical School of the Imperial University (Teikoku-Daigaku Igakubu), which means that he had 
returned to Japan from China before the end of January 1924. 
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from warlords there, and to establish an operational base in China for a 
Vietnamese nationalist movement. In other words, he maintained his 
residence in Japan primarily because his minimum living was guaranteed, 
and not necessarily because he was hoping to establish a base for his 
movement there. Rather, he apparently viewed China as a more promising 
operational base for Vietnamese activists. However, this situation began to 
change when the Japan-China War entered into fuller swing following the 
Lukow-kiao Incident of July 7, 1937. 
 
(2) Cuong De’s Efforts to Rally the Comrades from 1937 to 1939 
According to Cuong De’s recollections, he anticipated that with the 
escalation of the Japan-China War as a turning point, “the situation in East 
Asia would definitely undergo profound changes, giving all the suppressed 
peoples of East Asia the opportunity for winning independence.” He thought 
that he had first to put his organization in order, and to be ready to seize the 
opportunity when it came. More specifically, in early November 1937 he 
visited Hong Kong with the intent of rallying Vietnamese comrades in south 
China.23 
Here, again, China remained uppermost in his mind as a 
prospective base for revolutionary activities, but he now made a decisive 
change in his approach. Whereas previously he thought of rallying together 
Vietnamese political activists in exile by drawing financial support from 
Chinese warlords, he now began to count on the Japanese army for financial 
                                                  
23 CD, pp. 128-129. 
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backing, about which more will be said later.  
Putting aside this issue, upon his arrival in Hong Kong, Cuong De 
wrote letters to people such as Vu Hai Thu, Dang Su Mac, Tran Trung Lap, 
and Hoang Nam Hung who were in Guangzhou. However, due to the 
confusion caused by the ongoing escalation of the Japan-China War, his 
letters remained unanswered. While in Hong Kong waiting for the 
responses from Guangzhou, Cuong De faced the danger of being suspected 
as a spy for the Japanese authorities, so he returned to Japan in late 
November.  
Not long after his return, he received a letter from Vu Hai Thu, 
telling him that it was not until December 3 that he had received Cuong 
De’s letter, and that he had hurried to Hong Kong, but had arrived too 
late.24 
On the other hand, Hoang Nam Hung, another of the recipients, 
recounts as follows in his recollections: Nguyen Van Trung visited 
Guangzhou from Hong Kong in late November, carrying a letter from Cuong 
De with him; in the letter Cuong De said that he would personally visit 
Hong Kong in late November, convene revolutionary comrades, and present 
his own action plan to “let them adapt themselves to the situation of the 
Southeast Asian War (sic) now being waged by the Japanese”. At a meeting 
of the group of Vietnamese in Guangzhou, it was decided that Hoang Nam 
Hung would go to Hong Kong alone, but when he called on Cuong De at the  
Xin Xin hotel (Tan Tan in Vietnamese pronunciation) in Kowloon,, 25 he 
                                                  
24 CD, pp. 129-130. 
25 The hotel of the same name is mentioned in both CD, p. 129, and HNH, p. 185. 
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had already left for Japan. Cuong De had left a letter stating that he would 
return to Tokyo because the British authorities were beginning to be 
suspicious of him, and left instructions that members of the Guangzhou 
group should wait in Hong Kong since he would write to them soon. A check 
for 2,000 pounds from the Bank of Hong Kong was enclosed in the envelop.26 
The foregoing account of Hoang Nam Hung is in agreement with 
that of Cuong De referred to earlier. To note in passing, as far as we can 
infer from Hoang Nam Hung’s recollections, the group of Vietnamese in 
Guangzhou was the only one that Cuong De could get in touch with, among 
the various groups of Vietnamese existing in China at the time. In this 
regard it is important to point out that Cuong De stayed in Guangzhou for 
one year beginning in 1922, and that subsequently in 1932 Hoang Nam 
Hung, one of the leading members of the Guangzhou group, visited Japan 
himself and met with Cuong De.27 
 According to Hoang Nam Hung’s account, he remained in Hong 
Kong as instructed by Cuong De, and wrote to him in Japan. Meanwhile, 
Hung called upon his comrades in Guangzhou to join him in Hong Kong. 
Within one month, a group of people including Tran Boi Long, Phan Trong 
Doan, Do Khai Hoan, Mai Van Thong, and Tran Minh Duc had gathered 
there. They rented a house in Kowloon to wait for further communications 
from Cuong De. They covered their living expenses partly with the money 
he had left, and partly by taking on miscellaneous jobs among themselves, 
                                                  
26 The foregoing descriptions are based on HNH, pp. 185-186. 
27 HNH, pp. 168-172 writes that he left Japan in December 1932 after eight months’ stay, while 
stating also that he arrived in Japan after the assassination of Inukai Tusyoshi. Inukai was killed 
on May 1, 1932. 
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such as teaching at schools and writing articles for newspapers.  
At the same time, Hoang Nam Hung recollects, a person fresh from 
Japan, whose name in Vietnamese pronunciation was Hoa Chi, helped the 
group financially.28 
Hoa Chi can be identified as the Japanese name Wachi.29 This was 
none other than Wachi Yôji, an Army Colonel at the time, who was involved 
for many years in intrigues in Taiwan and China. In the period from June 
1938 to May 1939, he was serving as the chief of the Ran Kikan (Orchid 
Agency).30  
A Japanese civilian who was collaborating with the Ran Agency at 
the time remembers well that he became acquainted with a group of 
Vietnamese activists in Hong Kong through Wachi, and that among the 
group the person, whose name in Japanese pronunciation was Chin Ki-Sei, 
and who was very fluent in Japanese.31 This individual was Tran Huy 
Thanh, one of Cuong De’s close aides as will be mentioned later.  
The Ran Agency, based in Shanghai, was engaged in anti-Jiang 
Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) intrigues along with the warlords in southwestern 
China.32 Wachi is reported to have frequently moved between Shanghai 
and Hong Kong for this mission .33 
These pieces of evidence suggest that Wachi did in fact get in touch 
                                                  
28 HNH, p. 186. 
29 HNH usually spells it Hòa-Chi, but in some occasions Hòa-Chí as well. Wachi in the Vietnamese 
notation is expressed as Hòa Trí, but the syllables Chi and Tri are pronounced the same way in 
northern Vietnam. 
30 Nihon Kindai Shiryô Kenkyûkai ed.(1971) pp. 79 and 215; and Maruyama (1950) p. 152ff. 
31 Interview with Mr. Yamaguchi Getsuirô. 
32 Bôeichô Senshishitsu, ed.(1973) p. 172; Maruyama (1950) p. 165ff. 
33 Interview with Mr. Yamaguchi Getsurô. Furthermore, according to the author’s interview with 
Mr. Kadomatsu Shôichi, Wachi was staying at Matsubara Hotel in Hong Kong. 
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with Vietnamese activists in Hong Kong. Given, however, the fact that he 
was assigned to take charge of the Ran Agency in June 1938, it can be 
assumed that he began providing financial aid to Hung’s group after that. 
He probably became acquainted with Hung and his group through the 
intermediation of either Cuong De in Japan or by his Japanese supporters. 
Given the fact that Wachi had long been in touch with Matsui Iwane,34 it is 
also conceivable that Wachi knew Hung’s group through this connection.  
At any rate, it was definitely not the connections maintained by 
Section Eight (Dai-hachi-ka: Covert Operations Section) of the General 
Staff Office (Sanbo-Honbu) in Tôkyô or the Headquarters of the Army in 
Taiwan that linked him to Hung’s group. Since this will emerge as an 
important issue later, it is worth looking into the circumstances a little more 
closely.  
According to the testimonies of persons who were affiliated with 
Section Eight of the General Staff Office at the time, it was not until 1939 
that it came to know of Cuong De, and moreover it had no subsequent 
knowledge about Wachi’s contact with a group of Vietnamese.35 On the 
other hand, there is a testimony that Cuong De was introduced to Section 
Eight through the Headquarters of the Army in Taiwan,36 meaning that the 
Army in Taiwan had known of Cuong De from an earlier date. However, 
Wachi is reported to have been on bad terms also with the Headquarters of 
                                                  
34 According to Maruyama (1950) pp. 67 and 165, Wachi was a regimental commander under 
Commander-in-Chief Matsui at the time of the Shanghai Incident in August 1937. 
35 Interview with Mr. Kadomatsu Shôichi and elephone interview with Mr. Ozaki Masaji, both of 
whom were serving for Section Eight at that time. 
36 Interview with Mr. Kadomatsu Shôichi. 
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the Army in Taiwan.37 
 Returning to the main discourse, Hoang Nam Hung recounts that 
Wachi frequently met with Hung and his group, telling them the following: 
Cuong De was arguing for restructuring the revolutionary movement 
abroad and in Vietnam to revive anti-French activities; and given the 
prospects that the War would develop in a way that would demolish the 
strength of the French, the situation would unfold in favor of the 
Vietnamese.  
      In the meantime, Hung’s group received a long letter from Cuong De, 
pointing out that “before long the Japanese will continue advancing toward 
the East China Sea (sic), and Vietnam will be a very important place for 
them.” He argued that “for the purpose of reinforcing our revolutionary 
forces, we should temporarily join hands with Japan, and take advantage of 
this opportunity; at a later stage, we might as well base ourselves on 
historical factors well adapted to various activities for liberating our 
national land.”38 
Cuong De may have written the letter, with its strong tone of 
persuasion, because he was aware that Hoang Nam Hung and his group 
had been mainly acting under the protection of the Chinese warlords in 
Guangdong and Guangxi, and that they felt sympathy for China as Japan 
and China began to clash.  
There is no denying, moreover, that Wachi became interested in 
                                                  
37 Wachi is reported to have been on bad terms with Hayashi Yoshihide who was in charge of 
intelligence activities in Taiwan. Interviews with Mr. Yamaguchi Getsurô and with Mr. Ujihara 
Susumu 
38 HNH, pp. 187-189. 
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Vietnamese activists in China as part of his maneuvers against Jiang Jieshi. 
It should be remembered, in particular, that Wachi’s Ran Agency was 
carrying out intrigues toward military leaders in southwestern China, and 
that Hung and his group were closely in touch with these warlords. 
 Hoang Nam Hung and his group, when pressed to decide whether to 
abandon their pro-Chinese position in favor of a pro-Japanese one, held a 
careful discussion on the matter and concluded that on this occasion they 
should take advantage of the new change in the situation.  
They called on other groups of Vietnamese elsewhere in China to 
temporarily join hands with them. According to Hoang Nam Hung, the 
groups that responded favorably to his group’s appeal were as follows: the 
Viet Nam Phuc Quoc Hoi (Society for the National Restoration of Vietnam), 
the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Cach Mang Dang (Vietnamese National 
Revolutionary Party), and the Viet Nam Trung Uong Chap Hanh Uy Vien 
Hoi (Central Executive Committee of Vietnam).39 
The Viet Nam Phuc Quoc Hoi can be safely regarded as Cuong De’s 
group, based in Tôkyô. As a matter of fact, according to documents of the 
French authorities referred to by Jayne Werner, in November 1936 Cuong 
De was using the name Viet Nam Doc Lap Van Dong Dong Minh Hoi 
(League for the Independence Movement of Vietnam) for his group, but 
seems to have changed it to Viet Nam Phuc Quoc Dong Minh Hoi (League  
for the National Restoration of Vietnam) by 1938.40 
                                                  
39 HNH, pp. 189-190. 
40 Werner (1976) p. 196. A report of the French Indochinese Security Police stating that it was in 
early 1938 that the Phuc Quoc (Society for the National Restoration) began to recruit members in 
Cochin China (southern Vietnam) is quoted in ibid., p. 197. 
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The Viet Nam Quoc Dan Cach Mang Dang (Vietnamese National 
Revolutionary Party) was originally established in Guangzhou in 1930 by 
Hoang Nam Hung and his group (with Cuong De as Honorary Chairman), 
but the same founding members disbanded the Party in 1932. Given, 
however, the fact that its name continued to be used by surviving members 
of the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (Vietnamese Nationalist Party) in Nanjing, 
including Nguyen The Nghiep and Vu Hong Khanh, 41  the National 
Revolutionary Party mentioned here seems to be the group in Nanjing 
formerly affiliated with the Vietnamese Nationalist Party.  
The Viet Nam Trung Uong Chap Hanh Uy Vien Hoi (Central 
Executive Committee of Vietnam), on the other hand, is presumed to refer 
to the central executive body of the National Revolutionary Party in 
Guangzhou at the time of the Party’s inception in 1930 as mentioned 
above,42 and this name seems to have remained in use even after the 
Party’s disbandment was declared in 1932. If so, it refers to Hoang Nam 
Hung’s own group in Guangzhou.  
Supposing that the foregoing inference is correct, it follows that aside 
from Cuong De’s group in Japan, Hoang Nam Hung ‘s group was only able 
to get in touch with the surviving group of the Vietnamese Nationalist Party 
in Nanjing. Given that this group once belonged to the same organization 
(i.e., the National Revolutionary Party) as Hoang Nam Hung’s group, it 
must have been relatively easy for Hoang Nam Hung to contact them again. 
However, as will be noted later, no evidence is available that the Nanjing 
                                                  
41 HNH, pp. 155-161, and 174. 
42 HNH, p. 145ff. 
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group was present at the Phuc Quoc League’s inaugural meeting in 
Shanghai, or that it was represented in the League’s Central Committee 
which was elected at that occasion. In other words, despite Hoang Nam 
Hung’s recollections, it is unclear whether the Nanjing group actually took 
part in the Phuc Quoc League. One possible interpretation is that the 
Nanjing group, having sent its representative to Hoang Nam Hung’s group 
in Hong Kong to receive further explanations about the proposal, may have 
decided against participating in the League’s inaugural meeting in 
Shanghai for one reason or another. 
 In addition to the people mentioned above, a group in Siam also sent 
members, namely Truong An Man and Dang Ngoc Chau, to Hong Kong.43 
Apparently, Cuong De himself took steps to communicate with them. 
 
(2) Inauguration of the Phuc Quoc League 
Toward the end of February 1939, more than a year after his trip to Hong 
Kong at the end of 1937, Cuong De left Tôkyô for Shanghai to attend the 
inaugural meeting of the Phuc Quoc League together with Vietnamese 
gathered from other places.44 
At the meeting, it was formally decided to launch the League for the 
National Restoration of Vietnam (Phuc Quoc League) to rally various 
organizations both inside and outside Vietnam and to take advantage of the 
situation. The Action Program, drafted and proposed by Cuong De, was 
                                                  
43 HNH, p. 190. 
44 The descriptions offered by HNH, p. 190 and by CD, p. 130 are in agreement with each other 
with regard to the meeting’s place and timing. 
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adopted after revisions, and was printed by Truong Anh Man. 45  The 
concrete contents of the Action Program are unknown, but judging from the 
contents of three different pamphlets issued by the Phuc Quoc League 
(which the author has discovered among archival records of the former 
French Colonial Ministry in Paris, and all of which seem to have been used 
for propaganda activities inside Vietnam during the 1940s), the League 
obviously claimed to stand for constitutional monarchy. 
 The inaugural meeting selected the following central executive body: 
 Chairman: Cuong De 
 Organizing: Vu Hai Thu, also known as (a.k.a.) Nguen Hai Than 
 Financing: Tran Huu Cong, a.k.a. Nguyen Thuc Canh or Tran 
Trong Khac46 
 Propaganda: Truong Anh Man 
 Diplomacy47: Tran Huy Thanh, a.k.a. Tran Van An48 
 Training: Ho Hoc Lam, or Ho Ngoc Lam 
 Internal Affairs and Research49: Hoang Nam Hung 
 General Secretary: Dang Nguyen Hung 
 
                                                  
45 CD, pp. 130-131; HNH, pp. 190-191. 
46 Only the name Tran Huu Cong is given in both CD, p. 131 and HNH, p. 191; his real name was 
Tran Trong Khac and he was also known as Nguyen Thuc Canh. For the identity of the three 
names, see his own recollections, Tran Trong Khac (1971) p. 27. 
47 CD, p. 131 identifies the post as “External Affairs” and executive member in charge of it as Tran 
Hy Thanh while HNH, p. 191 identifies them respectively as “Diplomacy” and Tran Huy Thanh. 
The latter is adopted here. The name is a seudonym of Tran Van An. See CD, p. 132. 
48 CD, p. 131 spells the name Ho Hoc Lam, while HNH, passim. adopts the spelling Ho Ngoc Lam. 
On the other hand, Tran Trong Kac (1971) is inconsistent in the spelling of the name of this 
person, representing it as Ho Hoc Lam on various pages, but Ho Ngoc Lam on p. 89. 
49 CD, p.132 identifies the post as one for “Research” alone, while HNH, p. 191 
identifies it as one for “Internal Affairs and Research.” 
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 Vu Hai Thu, alias Nguyen Hai Than, had visited Japan for a short 
time in 1905 when the Dong Du (Studying-Abroad-in-Japan) movement was 
active. Subsequently, he came back to Vietnam, being involved in 
anti-French movement inside the country. After the movement broke down, 
he went into exile in China, becoming engaged in the activities of the Viet 
Nam Quang Phuc Hoi (Society for the Revival of Vietnam), of which Phan 
Boi Chau was the leading figure.  
Although Vu Hai Thu seems to have belonged to Hoang Nam 
Hung’s group in 1939, 50  there is no evidence showing either that he 
personally attended the Phuc Quoc League’s inaugural meeting, or that he 
was subsequently involved in any of the League’s activities. He seems to 
have parted company with the Guangzhou group following (or even before) 
the launching of the Phuc Quoc League, siding instead with the Chinese 
warlords. In 1942, he organized the Viet Nam Cach Mang Dong Minh Hoi 
(League for the Revolution of Vietnam) under the protection of Zhang Fakui, 
becoming one of the leading Vietnamese close to the Kuomintang (Chinese 
Nationalist Party).51 
 Tran Huu Cong, also known as Nguyen Thuc Canh or Tran Trong 
Khac, came to Japan in 1905 as one of the first members of the Dong Du 
movement. After studying at Shinbu Gakkô (a school founded by the 
Japanese Army General Staff Office for training students from China in 
military skills), Seijô Chûgaku (Middle School), and Tôkyô Kôtô Shihan 
                                                  
50 Information on Nguyen Hai Than is based on various sources, including: CD; HNH; Tran Trong 
Khac (1971); and Phan Boi Chau (1957). 
51 Devillers (1952) p. 103ff; and Jiang Yong Min (1971) p. 152ff. 
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Gakkô (Higher Normal School), he moved to China toward the end of 1917, 
basing himself in Hangzhou. From 1922 until 1931, he studied medicine in 
Germany and earned a doctorate. Subsequently, he returned to China, 
coordinating among his Vietnamese compatriots and the Chinese warlords 
in a wide array of places such as Shanghai, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, 
Fujian, and Guangxi.52 As of 1939, he does not seem to have belonged to 
any Vietnamese group; but having many acquaintances in the Chinese 
government and among warlords since his days at Shinbu School, being 
well versed in medicine as well as military skills, and having good command 
of a number of foreign languages, he was regarded as very useful by many 
people in a number of fields. Moreover, as he was well known as one of the 
first participants in the Dong Du movement, and as he had lived in Japan 
for a number of years, he must have attracted the attention of Cuong De 
and his group.  
Again, however, there is no evidence of Tran Huu Cong having 
committed himself deeply to any of the activities of the Phuc Quoc League. 
In his own memoirs, he makes no direct mention of the League or any 
affiliation with it. The only mention of his movements at the time is that at 
the end of July 1937 he moved from Fujian Province to Guangzhou, but soon 
went to the Hong Kong-Kowloon area to avoid the ravages of the 
Japan-China War, and then moved to Macao, staying there for nearly one 
year before moving to the interior of China by the beginning of 1941.53 It 
should be kept in mind, however, that this does not fully reject the 
                                                  
52 See his own memoirs, Tran Trong Khac (1971), passim. 
53 Tran Trong Khac (1971) pp. 96-97. 
 22
possibility that during his stay in Guangzhou or Hong Kong-Kowloon, he 
either came into contact with Hoang Nam Hung’s group for a short time or 
showed some interest in the proposed activities of the Phuc Quoc League. 
 Truong Anh Man, as pointed out above, was a participant from 
Siam. 
 Tran Huy Thanh, alias Tran Van An, originally from southern 
Vietnam, came to Japan in 1908 at the age of 10. He was one of few 
Vietnamese who remained in Japan even after the Dong Du movement 
collapsed. After graduating from Waseda University, he moved to China, 
teaching Japanese in Hankou (which later became part of Wuhan) and 
Beijing. In 1938, according to recollections by the Vietnamese, he was 
appointed “head of the Tianjin City government’s external affairs section”.54 
As one of the close aides of Cuong De, and being fluent in Japanese, he was 
appointed to take charge of the Phuc Quoc League’s external affairs (which 
consisted mainly of negotiations and liaison with the Japanese 
authorities). 55  He was actually present at the inaugural meeting in 
Shanghai. 
 Ho Hoc (or Ngoc) Lam traveled to Japan in 1908, when the Dong Du 
movement was active, and studied at the Tôkyô Dôbun Shoin (School of 
                                                  
54 CD, p. 132; Tran Trong Khac (1971) p. 28; and Phan Boi Chau (1957). The DRO file contains 
reports on him under the name of Tran Phuc An, recording that he came to Japan at the age of 9, 
studied at Rekisen Primary School in Tôkyô’s Koishikawa Ward, Mejiro Middle School, the 
Waseda University’s Seiji-Keizai-Ka Senmon-bu (whose literal translation should be the 
specialized course of the Department of Political Science and Economics), and Shanghai 
Dôbunshoin (Shanghai School of Same Letters, a sister institute of Tôkyô Dôbunshoin), and after 
working for a while as an inspector of students and instructor at Shanghai Dôbunshoin, moved 
back to Japan in August 1925, taking the post of a calligraphy teacher at Mejiro Middle School. 
According to Matsumoto (1975), Nishida Mitsugi’s autobiography also makes mention of Tran 
Van An. 
55 CD, p. 132. 
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Same Letters). After the movement collapsed, he moved to China, joined 
Duan Qirui’s forces, and then came under the patronage of the Zhejiang 
warlords in Hangzhou. This later turned out to be an important factor 
inducing people such as Phan Boi Chau and Tran Huu Cong to base 
themselves there. Subsequently, he joined the Nanjing Government’s army, 
and was stationed in Hunan Province in 1937.56 When the Pacific War 
entered its final stage, he went to Guangxi Province, became a communist 
sympathizer, and was involved in the Vietnam Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi 
(Society of Comrades  for the Revolution of Vietnam.57 Partly because of 
their mutual ties going back to Cuong De’s deportation from Japan in 1909, 
when Ho Hoc Lam, along with a younger brother of Tran Huu Cong, 
accompanied him to Shanghai,58 Ho Hoc Lam was also considered highly by 
Cuong De and his group. But in his case as well, there are no clear signs 
that he took an active part in the movement of the Phuc Quoc League that 
was launched in Shanghai in 1939. 
 Hoang Nam Hung left Vietnam for China in 1918 and became one of 
the core leaders of the Guangzhou group, as pointed out already. 
 Nothing is known about the personal record of Dang Nguyen Hung.  
 In addition to the people mentioned above, the inaugural meeting in 
Shanghai seems to have been joined by members of the Guangzhou group, 
including Tran Trung Lap and Mai Van Thong.  
In other words, the inaugural meeting was attended by just Cuong 
                                                  
56 Tran Trong Khac (1971) pp. 44-46. 
57 Jiang Yong Min (1971) p. 106ff. 
58 Tran Trong Khac (1971) pp. 44-47. 
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De’s group, the Guangzhou group, and the Siam group. Furthermore, there 
is no clear evidence that three of the people elected to the central executive 
body – Tran Huu Cong, Ho Hoc Lam, and Nguen Hai Than, the last of whom 
is deemed to have once been affiliated with the Guangzhou group – actively 
participated in the subsequent activities of the Phuc Quoc League. It should 
be concluded, therefore, that Cuong De at the time was not very successful 
in bringing together various groups of Vietnamese activists in China. It 
must be kept in mind, however, as will be noted later, that the League had 
moderate success in its subsequent effort to recruit some comrades from 
Hong Kong. 
 Whatever the situation was surrounding its inception, there is no 
denying that the League set communications with and organization of 
comrades in both Vietnam and abroad as its top priority for the time being. 
According to Hoang Nam Hung’s recollections, Hung himself was charged 
with the task of organizing within continental China. Mai Van Thong was 
dispatched to Siam. With regard to activists within Vietnam, efforts were 
made to get in touch with Tran Quang Vinh’s Cao Dai religious group and 
Tran Van ?n (a different person from Tran Van An mentioned above) in 
southern Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem and Phan Thuc Ngo in central Vietnam, 
and Duong Ba Trac, Nguyen Xuan Chu, and Le Toan in northern Vietnam.59 
These individuals would get attention in the 1940s from both the Japanese 
and French authorities as being close to Cuong De and being pro-Japanese. 
 After the Shanghai meeting, Cuong De returned to Japan in or 
                                                  
59 HNH. p. 191. 
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around March 1939.60 
Hoang Nam Hung and his associates went to Hong Kong to feed their 
comrades there with information on how the meeting had proceeded, and 
then returned to Guagzhou along with Tran Boi Long, Tran Trung Lap, 
Hoang Luong, Tran Minh Duc, and others.61 
Hung recounts that because Guangzhou was under occupation by the 
Japanese army (since October 1938), Cuong De obtained from Wachi a letter 
introducing Hung and his group to the Japanese military authorities there. 
Through this letter of introduction, Hung and his associates were given a 
meeting with Lieutenant General “Trung-Gia Anh-Phu” of the “Field  
Army Headquarters stationed in Guangdong Province,” wherein the 
lieutenant general proposed establishing a collaborative relationship 
between the Japanese military and the Vietnamese group of revolutionaries, 
to which Hung’s group agreed.62 
This Japanese lieutenant general can be identified as Nakano 
Hidemitsu63, who was actually a major general, not a lieutenant general at 
the time, and was serving as the head of the Guangdong Special Service 
Agency (Tokumu Kikan) from February 1939 until February 1940. 64 
According to one former serviceman knowledgeable about affairs at the time, 
                                                  
60 CD, p. 132. 
61 CD, p. 132; HNH, p. 192. 
62 HNH, p. 192. 
63 Nakano Hidemitsu ??????should be transcribed as Trung Dã Anh Quang in Vietnamese, 
but HNH usese Trung Giả Anh Phú. However, Da and Gia are pronounced the same way in 
northern accent, while the two tonetic marks ??? and ??? are sometimes mixed up in south 
Vietnam where HNH was printed. In the meantime, the author of HNH seems to have been 
confused Quang ???with Phú ???, since the two Chinese characters resemble each other. 
64 Nihon Kindai Shiryô Kenkyûkai (1971) pp. 52 and 215. 
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Wachi was on good terms with the commander of the Japanese army 
stationed in Guangdong (the 21st Army: Dai-nijuichi Gun).65 In fact, from 
May 1939, when Wachi left the Ran Agency, until September the same year, 
he was attached to the Guangdong army’s headquarters.66 
It is plausible from the foregoing observations that not only did 
Wachi introduce the group of Vietnamese activists to the Ghuangdong 
Special Service Agency, but that he also continued to remain in touch with 
them after he became affiliated with the Guangdong army’s headquarters. 
 Hoang Nam Hung and other members of the Guangzhou group were 
mainly engaged in two activities. One was collaboration with the Japanese 
in cultural fields: the group established a Hoa Nam Van Hoa Hiep Hoi 
(South China Cultural Association) so as to manipulate Chinese-language 
newspapers, with the aim of improving Chinese people’s feelings toward 
Japan, which were growing worse under the ongoing Japan-China War. 
Naturally, this activity would have been financially supported by the 
Japanese army in Guangdong. Members of the group active in these 
activities included Tran Boi Long, Do Khai Hoan, Phan Trong Doan, and 
Hoang Nam Hung.67 
Another activity, aimed at establishing a military organization of 
Vietnamese with the support of the Japanese army, was pursued by Tran 
Trung Lap and Hoang Luong. According to Hung’s recollections, Tran Trung 
                                                  
65 Interview with Mr. Hayashi Hidezumi. However, according to the author’s interview with Mr. 
Yamaguchi Getsurô, Wachi was not on good terms with Yazaki Kanjû who succeeded Nakano 
and served as the chief of the Guangdong Special Service Agency from March 1940 until 
September 1944, in spite of the fact that Wachi and Yazaki were in the same class at the Army 
Academy (Rikugun Shikan-Gakkô). 
66 Nihon Kindai Shiryô Kenkyûkai, ed (1971) p. 79. 
67 HNH, p. 192. 
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Lap was given the title of a captain affiliated with the Staff Office of the 
Japanese army in Guangdong.68 
 On the other hand, Tran Huy Thanh, alias Tran Van An, who was 
staying in Tianjin, moved to Japan at long last in May, had a reunion with 
Cuong De who was already back in Tôkyô, and was apparently assigned 
some work by him.69 The headquarters of the Phuc Quoc League was placed 
in Tôkyô. 
 
II. The Government-General of Taiwan’s Vietnamese Broadcasting Team 
 
While Cuong De’s group in Tôkyô and Hoang Nam Hung’s in Guangzhou 
were engaged in their respective activities, the European War broke out in 
September 1939. Suddenly, the policy of southward expansion became a 
focus of keen attention in Japan. Meanwhile, the Government-General 
(Sotokufu) of Taiwan conceived of a plan to start Vietnamese broadcasts 
                                                  
68 HNH, pp. 192-193. A photograph indicating the Japanese involvement in the activities of the 
armed organization led by Tran Trung Lap’s group is included in the same book on the 
unnumbered page immediately following p. 212. The Chinese calligraphic letters written in the 
right-hand side of the photograph should be translated as the “15th Anniversary of the Death of 
the Vietnamese Revolutionary Hero, Pham Hong Thai”. He committed suicide in June 1924, 
after failing to assassinate Governor-General of French Indochina Martial Merlin who was 
visiting Guangzhou. Thus, the photograph must have been taken in June 1939. In the Vietnamese 
caption attached to the photograph, the author of HNH explains it as showing “a band of 
revolutionary comrades of the Phuc Quoc Army before advancing to occupy the border area,” 
and identifies the figures standing in the back row in the photo from right to left as Tran Trung 
Lap, Tran Minh Duc, myself (i.e., Hoang Nam Huug), Hoang Luong, and Tran Boi Long, and 
those sitting in the front row as Dien Thon and Chi Dien. The last two names can be identified 
respectively as the Japanese names Tamura and Shida. Both are attired as Buddhist monks, with 
their hair unshaven, with one of them wearing both a beard and mustache. It is noteworthy that 
two Japanese attired as Buddhist monks were present at the ceremony which the Phuc Quoc 
Army observed in commemoration of a Vietnamese revolutionary hero, and moreover that these 
two Japanese were perhaps members or affiliates of the Japanese army or special service agency. 
69 CD, p. 132. 
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from Taipei, and asked Cuong De to help. According to Cuong De, the 
French Indochinese authorities at the time were manipulating public 
opinion in ways sympathetic toward the Anglo-American camp and against 
the axis countries, and the Japanese therefore found it necessary to provide 
the Vietnamese with “appropriate information.”70 
This plan by the Government-General of Taiwan gained the consent 
of Section Eight of the General Staff Office in Tôkyô.71 It was characterized 
by staff officers of Section Eight as “essentially for the purpose of 
propaganda, and is not meant for agitating for the overthrow of the French 
Indochinese authorities or the independence of Vietnam,” and as being 
independent from the Japanese army’s advance into French Indochina.72 
This testimony is in agreement with the foregoing recollection of Cuong De. 
 After getting the request, Cuong De immediately visited Taipei, and 
after consulting with the Government-General of Taiwan, communicated, 
through the intermediation of the Japanese consulate in Hong Kong, with  
Truong Anh Man, who was secretly staying there. At the same time, he 
asked Tran Huy Thanh, who stopped in Taipei on his way from Tôkyô to 
Guangzhou, to get in touch with comrades in Guangzhou.73 
 According to Hoang Nam Hung’s recollections, it was in October 
1939, when the Wang Jingwei government was established,74 that the 
                                                  
70 CD, p. 133. 
71 Interview with Mr. Kadomatsu Shôichi. 
72 Ibid. 
73 CD, p. 133. 
74 The Wang Zhao Ming’s government in Nanjing was actually established in March 1940, not 
October 1939. It should be pointed out, however, that after escaping from Chongqing in 
December 1938, Wang met with Prime Minister Konoe Ayamaro in Tôkyô in May 1939, and had 
discussions with Wang Kemin and others in Nanjing in October the same year. Thus he had 
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Japanese authorities asked for Cuong De’s help in organizing a team to 
support the Vietnamese broadcasting project. Toward the end of October, 
shortly after learning about the plan, Hung left Guangzhou for Taipei 
accompanied by Do Khai Hoan, Hoang Binh and his wife, and Nguyen Dai 
Kha.75 
Cuong De’s recollections are, however, that it was only Hoang Nam 
Hung and Do Khai Hoan who arrived in Taipei from Guangzhou at the end 
of October, and that Hoang Binh and his wife came to Taipei through the 
introduction of Le Kien, who came from Hong Kong somewhat later.76 This 
suggests that Hoang Binh and his wife joined the broadcasting team not 
from Guangzhou but from Hong Kong.  
By early December, Truong Anh Man, Le Trung, and Le Kien had 
arrived from Hong Kong to join the team.77 According to Hoang Nam Hung, 
a total of 21 Vietnamese gathered together in Taipei.78 Thus, many of the 
members of the Phuc Quoc League, including Cuong De, were to stay in 
Taipei for an extended period. They therefore decided to relocate the 
League’s headquarters from Tôkyô to Taipei.79 
 The Vietnamese Broadcasting Team (Betonamu-go Hôsô-han) was 
organized by the Information Section (Jôhô-ka) of the Government-General 
                                                                                                                                                
already started working toward establishing a new central regime by late 1939. 
75 HNH, p. 194. 
76 CD, p. 134. 
77 The descriptions of CD (p. 134) and HNH (p. 195) are in agreement with each other as far as 
the names of these three people are concerned. On the timing of their arrival in Taipei, however, 
the former claims that it was in early December, while the latter put it the month following that 
of Huug and his associates’ arrival (at the end of October). 
78 HNH, p. 195. 
79 CD, p. 134; HNH, p. 195. 
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of Taiwan,80 with Hoang Nam Hung, Do Khai Hoan, Truong Anh Man, and 
Le Trung given charge of supervisory responsibilities.81 In addition to the 
Vietnamese, a Japanese woman (or two women) who had lived long in 
Vietnam and could speak the language also joined the team. 82  No 
information is available as to when the broadcast started, but it is reported 
that every day’s program began at 10:00 p.m.83 The individuals on the team, 
after having lived in exile for many years, seem to have been delighted to 
have the chance to talk directly to their countrymen in Vietnam.84 
 To add in passing, according to the testimony of a Japanese involved 
in the project, the Broadcasting Team was organized on the basis of 
cooperation between Section Eight of the General Staff Office in Tôkyô and 
the Government-General of Taiwan, as pointed out already.85 It is reported, 
on the other hand, that Section Eight had no knowledge of Wachi’s and the 
Japanese Guangdong army’s involvement in Vietnamese activists,86 and 
that members engaged in intelligence activities in Taiwan at the time were 
                                                  
80 CD, p. 134. 
81 CD (p. 134) states that they were “commissioned by the Information Section of the 
Government-General” to take charge of the team, while HNH (p. 195) states that they were 
“assigned by the Government-General to assume the responsibility in the [broadcasting] 
supervisory team.” 
82 CD (p. 134) specifies one Japanese woman by the name of ba Muta Hanako, while HNH (p. 
195) says that several Japanese women joined the team, identifying two of them by the names of 
ba Muta and co Gamada. (“Ba” means a relatively elder and/or married woman, while “co” 
indicates a younger and/or unmarried woman). In his interview with the author, Mr. Kadomatsu 
Shôichi (formerly a staff officer of Section Eight) recounts that there was in Hanoi a Japanese 
woman named “Ohana,” who was originally from Amakusa, Kumamoto Prefecture, and who 
was a former karayuki-san (young Japanese girls sent abroad to work as prostitutes), that during 
his stay in French Indochina in 1938-39 he employed her as his maid, that in order to help make 
her livelihood secure, he introduced her to the Government-General of Taiwan, and that she was 
aged somewhere between 50 and 60. This must have been Muta Hanako, referred to by CD 
above. 
83 HNH, p. 195. 
84 HNH, pp. 194-195. 
85 See notes 71 and 82 in this Section. 
86 Interview with Mr. Kadomatsu Shôchi; telephone interview with Mr. Ozeki Masaji. 
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on bad terms with both Wachi 87  and the Special Service Agency in 
Guangdong.88 
What is noteworthy here, therefore, is that the Japanese activities 
toward the Vietnamese Phuc Quoc League were carried out by two different 
bodies – the Ran Agency led by Wachi and the Special Service Agency in 
Guangdong on one hand and Section Eight of the General Staff Office in 
Tôkyô and the Japanese authorities in Taiwan on the other. They acted 
independently from, and perhaps in rivalry with, each other. 
 In this connection, the following episode recorded in Hoang Nam 
Hung’s recollections is suggestive: in or around September 1940, a Japanese 
lieutenant colonel affiliated with the army unit in Guangzhou visited Taipei, 
and asked Hoang Nam Hung to return to Guangzhou and take charge of the 
Phuc Quoc Army’s southern advance; Hung for his part, because he knew 
well that the military authorities in Taiwan were willing to retain him, did 
not tell the authorities in Taipei about this request, and sent Le Trung to 
Guangzhou by air in place of himself. However, the army unit in Guangzhou, 
which needed Hung but had no use for Le Trung, sent him back to Taipei on 
the same day.89 This anecdote suggests that the Vietnamese seem to have 
been aware of the antagonism between the Japanese authorities in Taipei 
and those in Guangzhou, and kept in touch with both of them, while trying 
                                                  
87 See note 37 in Section I. 
88 Interviews with Messrs. Yamaguchi Getsurô, Tsuchiya Yonekichi, Kadomatsu Shôichi, and 
Ujihara Susumu. 
89 HNH, p. 196. This episode is placed in paragraphs following the description of another matter 
which took place at the end of September 1940. The book identifies the timing of the episode to 
be “approximately one month after” the incident described in the preceding paragraph. But this 
would mean that the episode took place after the Phuc Quoc Army had already begun its 
southern advance on September 22. It is assumed here, therefore, that the episode took place 
during September 1940. 
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to carefully distribute their members to the two rival organizations as they 
were requested. 
 In Taipei, in response to a further request from the Japanese side, 
Hoang Nam Hung, Duong Van Thu, Giap Ngoc Minh, and Le Trung began 
teaching Vietnamese to Japanese officers who were preparing for the 
imminent advance into Vietnam. Hung recounts that he and others on the 
teaching staff, well aware of the purpose of the language instruction, did not 
only teach their students Vietnamese, but also told them about Vietnamese 
customs and habits, as well as their hopes for independence and 
liberation.90 
As the Japanese army’s advance into northern French Indochina 
drew near, Hung and his associates began to look forward to a 
communication from the “Japanese Staff Office” instructing them to leave 
Taiwan with the Japanese navy and to land on Vietnam.91 
This indicates that, though they had gathered in Taipei with the 
original and primary purpose of organizing propaganda broadcasting, the 
Vietnamese gradually became involved (whatever intention the Japanese 
might have had) in the Japanese plan to advance into northern Indochina, 
and came to identify Taipei as a base where they would remain until their 
re-entry into Vietnam.  
At any rate, the Japanese army’s advance into northern Indochina, as 
is well known, was being pursued in accordance with two plans: one 
envisaging the Fifth Division (Dai-go Shidan) of the army in the Guangxi 
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area advancing by land to cross the borders and enter Dong Dang and Lang 
Son; the other envisaging both the army (namely the Indochina 
Expeditionary Force: Indoshina Haken-gun) and the navy advancing from 
Hainan Island by sea to land on Do Son or its vicinity.92 Apparently, Hung 
and his group in Taipei were expecting to advance into Vietnam as part of 
the latter plan. 
 On the other hand, members of the Phuc Quoc League in 
Guangzhou were preparing to advance into Vietnam by land from the 
Guangxi area, as envisaged by the former plan. As mentioned already, in 
Guangzhou, Tran Trung Lap and Hoang Luong had been charged with the 
task of organizing armed forces. It should be kept in mind here, however, 
that since the autumn of 1939 when its main body moved to Taipei, the 
Phuc Quoc League was concentrating its efforts primarily in the 
propaganda broadcast in Taipei. In other words, activities in Guangzhou 
had been reduced to a matter of secondary importance, as evident from the 
fact that neither Tran Trung Lap nor Hoang Luong, though charged with 
the responsibility for organizing armed forces there, were members of the 
League’s central executive body.  
However, by August 1940, the Japanese army in Guangdong was 
finalizing its plan to advance into Vietnam, making it necessary for the 
headquarters of the Phuc Quoc League reinforce its activities in the 
Guangzhou area. On August 12, 1940, Cuong De appointed Tran Huy 
Thanh, a close aide who was in charge of the League’s external affairs and 
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was fluent in Japanese, as the organization’s chief representative in 
Guangzhou. Cuong De charged him with the task of communicating with 
the Japanese military in Guangzhou and supervising the activities of armed 
units undertaken by Tran Trung Lap and others.93 
 In the meantime, Coung De recounts, the League placed Le Kien in 
Hong Kong as a liaison d’affairs, given its important and convenient 
position in communication94 and transportation with Vietnam, Thailand 
and various parts of China. As a matter of fact, as evident from the 
foregoing observations, several Vietnamese from Hong Kong joined the 
Phuc Quo League’s activities in Taiwan. It goes without saying, however, 
that Hong Kong was important for the League only as a contact point, and 
that Taipei and Guangzhou carried far greater importance at the time as a 
base for broadcast and propaganda activities, in the former case, and as a 
base for military campaigns, in the latter. 
 
?.  The Insurrection by the Vietnamese Phuc Quoc Army 
 
The last months of 1939 turned out to be a period of extreme importance in 
Japan’s policy toward French Indochina. First, the mainstream faction of 
the army, in the face of frustrations of its longstanding policy of northern 
expansion, began to show interest in a southward advance. More specifically, 
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the policy of northern expansion suffered a major setback with its defeat in 
the Nomonhan Incident (May to September 1939) and the conclusion of the 
German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact in August.  
Following the removal of many members of the General Staff Office 
in Tôkyô who were held liable for the defeat in the Nomonhan Incident, 
Major General Tominaga Kyôji was appointed on September 13, 1939 to be 
chief of the First Department (Dai-ichi-bu). This Department, usually called 
Sakusen-bu (Strategies and Operations Department), was one of the most 
important organs in the General Staff Office. Subsequently, he emerged as a 
leading advocate of the policy of militaristic southward expansion within 
the army.95 
Second, this was followed closely by the beginning of the European 
War on September 3. Japan thought that it was now time to start pressing 
France to make concessions on French Indochinese issues, beginning with 
the severance of the aid-to-Jiang route.96 
Third, an operation into Nanning was launched on November 15. The 
operation was forcibly advocated as early as in September by Tominaga 
shortly after his appointment. The navy had no objection to the operation, 
which it had been arguing for. Though the operation’s stated purpose was to 
cut the aid-to-Jiang route, and even though this must have been the 
primary objective for the time being, the First Department of the General 
Staff Office at the time, under Tominaga, intended to use the operation to 
pave the way for Japan’s policy toward French Indochina, and ultimately for 
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an overall southward expansion policy.97 
In fact, the Central Agreement of October 14, 1939 between the Army 
and Navy concerning the Nanning Operation contained an appended clause 
stating that “the Imperial Headquarters (Daihonei) shall deal with French 
Indochinese issues, following the occupation of Nanning.”98 The Nanning 
operation was thus important not only because it was regarded by the 
military, and particularly the General Staff Office’s First Department, as a 
first step of further southward advance toward French Indochina and 
eventually Southeast Asia in general, but also because the operation led to 
the stationing of fighting units of the Japanese army in the border area 
between China and Vietnam.  
Moreover, at the time of the Nanning operation, the organizational 
structure of the army’s units in the Guangdong and Guangxi areas was 
further expanded and elevated in status. More specifically, the 21st Army in 
Guangdong was abolished, and replaced by the newly established South 
China Theatre Force (Minami-Shina Hômen-Gun, which was of higher 
status.99 Furthermore, as a result of the highhanded manipulation by 
Tominaga and his subordinates, on July 10, 1940, this unit was removed 
from the command of the General Headquarters of the China Expeditionary 
Force (Shina Haken-Gun) and placed under the direct command of Tôkyô.100 
In the meantime, as Nanning was brought under Japanese occupation, the 
22nd Army (Dai-nijûni Gun) was newly established there and field troops 
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mainly consisting of the Fifth Division (Dai-go Shidan) were placed under 
its command.101 
Once a new headquarters was established and equipped with fighting 
units, it would naturally claim a greater say of its own, and would also start 
insisting on its own operational schemes in order to justify its unique 
existence. This was especially so, given the sense of skepticism that had 
prevailed from the outset among the top military leaders in Tôkyô about the 
effectiveness of the Nanning operation, and also the fact that, practically 
speaking, the forces in the Guangxi area had already proved to be very 
costly to maintain while failing to produce tangible results in their attempt 
to cut the aid-to-Jiang route. The military unit in Nanning (i.e., the 22nd 
Army) and its superior organization, the Guangdong Headquarters of the 
South China Theatre Force, in an effort to effect a breakthrough in this 
situation, began to insist on further advances into the interior of China as 
well as into French Indochina.102 This insistence on the part of the military 
leaders in Guangdong and Nanning resonated with the militaristic and 
hard-line attitudes taken by the General Staff Office’s First Department 
headed by General Tominaga.103 
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 As the year 1940 began, the war situation in Europe developed 
rapidly, with the Netherlands surrendering to Germany in May, and France 
in June. Within Japan, the Konoe cabinet took office in July, adopting the 
“Outline of the Basic National Policy” and the “Outline of the Empire’s 
National Policy to Cope with the Changing Situation,” thereby giving 
approval to a new national policy of more vigorous interference toward the 
Southern Area (Nanpô).104 It should be noted, however, that at that point in 
time the government and the mainstream of the military were hoping to 
realize a peaceful advance into French Indochina. Inside the army, however, 
the General Staff Office’s First Department under Tominaga and the 
leaders of the units in Guangdong and Nanning opposed the idea of a 
peaceful advance, instead advocating an operation to seize French 
Indochina by force.105 
 In other words, by July 1940 there had emerged within the 
Japanese leaders two conflicting schools of thought over what policy Japan 
should take toward French Indochina. On the one side, the government and 
the mainstream faction in the military insisted upon a peaceful advance 
into French Indochina. In accord with the wishes of this group, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs repeatedly negotiated with the French embassy in Tôkyô 
and the Vichy government in France, while in Ha Noi the French 
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Indochinese Border Monitoring Body (Futsuin Kokkyô Kanshidan), also 
known as the Nishihara Mission (Nishihara Kikan), which had been 
dispatched in June 1940, was negotiating with the French Indochinese 
authorities.  
      Moreover, in preparation for peaceful advance into Indochina, an 
Indochina Expeditionary Force (Indoshina Haken-Gun) was organized on 
September 6, which was to move from Hainan Island by sea and land on Do 
Son (near the port city of Hai Phong) with the navy’s escort. If a peaceful 
advance was achieved, therefore, the Fifth Division under the command of 
the 22nd Army in Nanning would be deprived of the honorable chance to be 
the first to advance into and stay in French Indochina, and would instead be 
forced to accept the humble role of withdrawing from the Guangxi area, 
simply passing through the Vietnamese territory after the Indochina 
Expeditionary Force completed its peaceful landing.106 
 On the other side were the General Staff Office’s First Department 
led by Tominaga, the headquarters in Guangdong and Nanning, and the 
Fifth Division at the front, which stubbornly insisted on a belligerent 
advance. During the night on September 22, while aware that a military 
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pact had been concluded between the Japanese and French Indochinese 
authorities in Ha Noi, Japanese troops stationed in Guangxi, ignoring the 
pact, forcibly carried out an operation by force of arms.107 
 As to the question of how the Vietnamese behaved during this period, 
the main body of the Phuc Quoc League in Taipei, as pointed out already, 
seems to have been expecting to move to Vietnam by sea together with the 
Indochina Expeditionary Force.108 On the other hand, Tran Trung Lap and 
other members of the League in Guangzhou moved in advance to the 
Guangxi area to wait until they could enter Vietnam by land along with the 
Fifth Division.109 
 Tran Trung Lap and his group were joined by Ujihara Susumu and 
Masui Jun’ichi in Nanning, Guangxi Province. These two Japanese were 
employees of the Taiwan Colonization Corporation (Taiwan Takushoku 
Kaisha), who had once lived in French Indochina. They came from Taipei to 
Guangzhou at the request of Lieutenant Colonel Nakai Masutarô, a staff 
officer in charge of intelligence activities affiliated with the South China 
Theater Force. From Guangzhou, they arrived in Nanning on July 20, 1940, 
by a military plane, as civilian employees attached to the Fifth Division.110 
It is reported that Tran Trung Lap and his group came to Nanning after the 
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arrival of Ujihara and Masui, and that the group consisted of just three or 
four persons.111 
 In the middle of the night of September 22, Tran Trung Lap and his 
group crossed the border into Vietnam along with the Japanese army’s Fifth 
Division. According to the recollections of the Vietnamese, they gathered 
together various forces, including Vietnamese soldiers in the French 
Indochinese colonial army who had been taken as prisoners of war by the 
Japanese army, Vietnamese youths from various areas who had volunteered 
to join them, and troops consisting of ethnic minorities under the command 
of Nong Quoc Long; and organized them into a new force of nearly 2,000 
men.112 
On the other hand, Ujihara remembers as follows: when the Phuc 
Quoc Army was organized in the mountains of Dong Dang and Lang Son, it 
had a force of about 500 men. Subsequently on September 27 or 28, in the 
drill field of Lang Son, the Japanese army released Vietnamese soldiers in 
the French Indochinese army who had been kept there as prisoners of war; 
on that occasion, Lap and other members called on the released soldiers to 
join the Phuc Quoc Army, recruiting several hundred. The weapons and 
ammunitions of the French Indochinese colonial army which the Japanese 
had captured were handed over to the Phuc Quoc Army by Colonel Gondô 
Masatake. As it started to move southward from Lang Son, the ranks of the 
Phuc Quoc Army swelled to include some 1,500 soldiers.113 
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 The Phuc Quoc Army 114  was led by Tran Trung Lap as 
Commander-in-Chief, Hoang Luong as Deputy Commander,115 and Ujihara 
and Masui as Advisors.116 As the Japanese army advanced further, the 
Phuc Quoc Army’s area of activity expanded, reportedly stretching beyond 
the area occupied by the Japanese soldiers, and reaching as far as the 
outskirts of Ha Noi. As it expanded its sphere of influence, according to 
Ujihara’s testimony, the Phuc Quoc Army issued decrees and even military 
currencies.117 Merchants from Lang Son contributed money to it.118 
 However, the Phuc Quoc Army’s good fortunes were short-lived. In 
order to hold it in check to restore control over it, the government and the 
mainstream military leaders in Tôkyô quickly started to straighten out the 
situation, urging the Nishihara Mission to negotiate with its counterparts 
in Ha Noi. On September 25, a ceasefire agreement was concluded between 
them. On October 5, the Fifth Division released its French Indochinese 
prisoners of war, and toward the end of October, it was compelled to 
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withdraw from Indochina via Hai Phong.119 
As the French colonial troops returned to the occupied area to take 
place of the withdrawing Japanese soldiers, the Phuc Quoc Army, now 
having been deprived of its backing, confronted a crisis. According to Cuong 
De, on October 25 Colonel Nakai and Tran Huy Thanh visited the Lang Son 
area from Ha Noi, met leaders of the Phuc Quoc Army, and tried to persuade 
them to withdraw to China.120 
Colonel Nakai must have been the Nakai Masutarô referred to earlier. 
Since he had been transferred from his position as a staff officer of the 
South China Theatre Force to a staff officer for strategies and operations 
attached to the Indochina Expeditionary Force, he must have entered Ha 
Noi by sea(or by air),121 and Tran Huy Thanh likely accompanied him on 
that occasion. 
 According to Cuong De, Hoang Luong agreed to withdraw as 
persuaded, but Tran Trung Lap, who refused, was captured by the French 
Indochinese colonial army and killed on December 26.122 
Hoang Nam Hung’s recollections give us a slightly different version of 
the story: the Phuc Quoc Army refused to end its war of resistance even 
after the Japanese withdrawal, dividing itself into three units respectively 
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led by Lap, Luong, and Nong Quoc Long. Each force began to retreat toward 
the Guangxi area while continuing to fight. Of the three leaders, Lap was 
unfortunately captured, but the two others managed to withdraw into the 
Chinese territory.123 As they entered Guangxi, the surviving members of 
the Phuc Quoc Army were regarded as pro-Japanese, and were disarmed by 
the Chinese authorities. They were, however, allowed to keep the existing 
organization intact. 124  Subsequently, they seem to have either joined 
pro-Kuomintang Vietnamese organizations or organizations affiliated with 
the Viet Minh. 
 Meanwhile, the members of the Phuc Quoc League in Taipei, who 
were closely watching the unfolding of the situation, seem to have been 
prevented from landing in Vietnam along with the Japanese Indochina 
Expeditionary Force. Upon hearing the news that the Phuc Quoc Army led 
by Tran Trung Lap’s group, after having crossed into Vietnam along with 
the Fifth Division, had been abandoned by the Japanese and fallen victim to 
the French colonial army’s suppression, they were so deeply discouraged 
and indignant that some filed resignations with the Government-General of 
Taiwan.125 Ultimately, however, all the members seem to have remained 
there under the Japanese protection.126 
 Cuong De returned to Tôkyô from Taipei in May 1941, and the Phuc 
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Quoc League’s headquarters was also moved to Tôkyô.127 The League’s 
administrative affairs were taken care of by Nguyen Rinh Nhiep, who had 
escaped from Vietnam around that time and arrived in Tôkyô via Taiwan,128 
and subsequently by Truong Anh Man.  
Hoang Nam Hung continued to engage in activities at the 
Information Section of the Government-General of Taiwan.129 
 
Conclusions 
 
The earlier sections of this paper have examined the circumstances 
surrounding the establishment of the League for the National Restoration 
of Vietnam (Phuc Quoc League), its activities mainly in Guangzhou and 
Taipei, as well as the process leading to the Phuc Quoc Army’s insurrection 
and its ultimate failure.  
Seen in the light of these observations, it is clear that the hypothesis 
advanced by Truong Buu Lam mentioned in the Introductory Section, that 
the Phuc Quoc army’s insurrection was an action taken independently of the 
Japanese army, is untenable.  
Lam’s argument rests on the following three contentions. First, it is 
inconceivable that the Japanese army in Guangdong would have handed 
over weapons to a group of Vietnamese activists without receiving an 
explicit order from Tôkyô. Second, providing assistance to Vietnamese 
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nationalists was evidently not yet part of Japan’s national policy in 1939 
and 1940. If one assumes that Japan had something to do with the armed 
insurrection, then it becomes impossible to explain why the Japanese policy 
was so inconsistent, namely, why the Japanese army collaborated with the 
insurgent Vietnamese force only for the first several days and then 
abandoned it so easily. And third, given the fact that local groups close to or 
affiliated with the Phuc Quoc League had been active in the area for some 
time, the Phuc Quoc Army could have gotten hold of the weapons, even in 
the absence of Japanese help.130 
 What stands out about Lam’s argument is that it is based on the 
assumption that in working out and implementing policies, the Japanese 
government and military organizations, from top to bottom within each 
organ, and from the center in Tôkyô all the way down to the smallest 
overseas units, were always consistent, and totally free from contradictions 
or discrepancies in their understanding of the policy objectives and in their 
choice of means and methods for policy implementation. Arguments 
founded upon this sort of assumption are precisely what Graham Allison 
calls arguments in the theory of policymaking process predicated on a 
“rational model.”131 As Allison and others point out, however, the actual 
policymaking and policy implementing processes in government and 
military organizations often operate in ways that cannot be explained from 
the standpoint of the “rational model,” because individual units have 
functions and routines of their own, on the one hand, as well as interests 
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and claims of their own, on the other.132 
In reference to the contents of this paper, precisely because they had 
functions and routines of their own, organizational units such as the Ran 
Agency, the Special Service Agency in Guangdong, the Government-General 
of Taiwan, and Section Eight of the General Staff Office were able to carry 
out some actions at their own discretion, and within the limits of the budget 
under their own control. In undertaking such secret and/or half-secret 
operations and actions, individual units might or might not have asked 
superior organs for judgment or approval, and might or might not have filed 
reports with superior organs on an ex post facto basis. In the case of 
propaganda and intelligence organs, in particular, it would not necessarily 
be regarded as overstepping their authority even if they came into contact 
with a group of Vietnamese activists at their own discretion, giving them 
financial aid, obtaining information from them, and having them engage in 
propaganda activities. 
 By contrast, helping a group of Vietnamese activists organize an 
armed unit and providing weapons to them were qualitatively different 
from the propaganda and information gathering activities mentioned above; 
they went beyond the authority and daily routines peculiar to special 
service agencies or military units. These activities, therefore, must be 
explained in terms different from propaganda and intelligence activities. 
 What is important here is that, as pointed out already, there existed 
within the Japanese government and military at the time two different 
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groups with conflicting interests and claims. In Allison’s model, two groups 
at odds, with a conflict of interests and claims, are usually assumed to find a 
point of compromise through “bargaining.” 133  However, the Japanese 
military advance into northern French Indochina in1940 was exceptional, 
in the sense that each of the two concerned groups implemented its own 
plan without a compromise being reached through bargaining.  
More specifically, as pointed out in the preceding section, the army 
stationed in south China and the faction in the General Staff Office led by 
Tominaga, upholding interests and claims that ran counter to those of the 
Japanese government and the military’s mainstream leaders, forcibly 
carried out their operation into French Indochina by land and by force of 
arms, thus committing an act that was not endorsed by their superiors in 
Tôkyô and that exceeded their own authority.  
The Japanese government and mainstream leaders of the army and 
the navy were of the opinion that the advance into French Indochina should 
be carried out peacefully. Accordingly , an agreement was reached between 
Generals Nishihara and Martin through their negotiations in Ha Noi. It 
prescribed that the Japanese forces should peacefully advance into French 
Indochina, and that the advance should be first led not by the Fifth Division 
under the command of the 22nd Army stationed in the Guangxi area, but by 
a separately organized Indochina Expeditionary Force which would arrive 
by sea.  
The 22nd Army and the Fifth Division were taken by surprise, and 
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very humiliated by this, because they had been making preparations with 
the firm belief that they would naturally have the honor of being the first to 
charge into French Indochina. Another important factor was the fact that 
upon the completion of the Japanese advance into northern Indochina, the 
22nd Army was scheduled to be abolished, as its stationing in the Nanning 
area was costly and was proving useless in controlling the supply route to 
help the Kuomintang forces. Moreover, once the Japanese military 
advanced into northern Indochina, it would become possible to more 
effectively carry out the activities to cut the aid-to-Jiang route from within 
Indochinese territory, making the Japanese forces in Nanning even more 
redundant. It is undeniable that the leaders of the 22nd Army and the Fifth 
Division must have wished to make a name for themselves before being 
removed from the front line of the southward advance. In the meanwhile, 
the General Staff Office’s First Department under General Tominaga, which 
had drawn up the plan for the Nanning operation and from the outset had 
advocated an advance into Indochina by force of arms, seems to have been 
sympathetic toward the Fifth Division’s military operation into  
Vietnamese territory. 
 The Phuc Quoc Army was organized at the initiative of these 
overseas organizations of the army that were insistent upon a hard-line 
policy, and it entered Indochina along with them.134 
                                                  
134 This paper leaves much to be desired in analyzing what specific intent or purpose the Japanese 
army headquarters in Guangdong and Nanning as well as the Fifth Division had in supporting the 
Phuc Quoc Army. Moreover, it also remains unknown whether Tominaga and his subordinate 
staff officers at the General Staff Office’s First Department had concrete knowledge of the 
existence and activities of the Phuc Quoc Army. 
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In response to the first question raised by Truong Buu Lam, the 
following can be pointed out. So long as the military charge into French 
Indochina was carried out by overseas units of the army without the 
approval of the government and mainstream military leaders of Japan, it is 
also natural to consider the subsequent act of giving support to or supplying 
weapons to the Phuc Quoc Army as having been undertaken by the military 
leaders in the field at their own discretion. What is more, as noted in the 
preceding section, the weapons supplied to the Phuc Quoc Army had 
actually been confiscated by the Japanese from the French Indochinese 
colonial army. If the Japanese military unit had diverted its own weapons 
and ammunition to Vietnamese activists without permission, it must have 
been subjected to disciplinary action, as pointed out by Truong Buu Lam, 
but the Fifth Division at the time was in possession of weapons seized from 
the French colonial army, which were not on the list of officially supplied 
articles.  
 With regard to the second question raised by Truong Buu Lam–that 
if the Japanese army had much to do with the Phuc Quoc Army, then it is 
difficult to understand why its policy was so inconsistent, or put in other 
words, why the Japanese army, having once closely collaborated with the 
Phuc Quoc Army, abruptly changed its attitude and abandoned the 
Vietnamese activists–it should be pointed out as follows.  
The Japanese military unit that charged inside French Indochina 
from the Guangxi area was one that insisted upon a hard-line militaristic 
policy, and was willing to protect the Phuc Quoc Army. However, after the 
hard-line faction won battles in the early stages of the offense and occupied 
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Dong Dang and Lang Son, the mainstream faction of the military, which 
was opposed to the militaristic faction, intervened to try to straighten out 
the situation. In Indochina, the Nishihara Mission negotiated a ceasefire 
with the French authorities, and saw to the Japanese occupation forces’ 
withdrawal, while the army’s top leaders in Tôkyô took a series of steps, 
including the demotion of First Department Chief Tominaga and 
middle-ranking officers in the Strategies and Operations Section 
(Sakusen-Ka)  of that Department; the placement of the commanders of 
the South China Theatre Force and the 22nd Army on the reserve list, and 
the handing down of punishments to the chief of the Fifth Division, and the 
chiefs of brigades, regiments, and the battalions involved for their failure to 
prevent the border violation incident of September 6 (a small incident which 
took place earlier than the military operation to advance into Indochinese 
territory). Furthermore, the Fifth Division was ordered to withdraw from 
the occupied area in Indochina and to relocate to the Shanghai area, the 
headquarters of the 22nd Army was dissolved on the grounds that it had 
finished performing its role of cutting the aid-to-Jiang route, and the forces 
that remained in Nanning and its vicinity were ordered to withdraw via the 
Qinzhou Bay.135 
Thus, all the groups that had insisted upon entering into French 
Indochina from Guangxi by force of arms were rooted out and removed from 
the scene. This naturally means that the group that had supported the Phuc 
Quoc Army disappeared from Indochina and its vicinity. Subsequently, the 
                                                  
135 Bôeichô Senshishitsu, ed. (1975) p. 289ff.; Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, ed. (1963) p. 239ff. 
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situation was taken over by the group advocating a peaceful advance into 
Indochina and cooperation with the French colonial authorities. In this way, 
the Japanese army behaved in such a way as to give the impression to 
outsiders that it had made a complete turnaround. 
      As for the third question raised by Truong Buu Lam, there is 
certainly no denying that forces including the one led by Nong Quoc Long 
had been in existence before the advance by the Phuc Quoc Army. However, 
in order to properly arm the rapidly growing ranks of the Phuc Quoc Army, 
the weapons seized from the French Indochinese colonial army were 
indispensable, and these were made available only with the cooperation of 
the Japanese army.  
 Before concluding this paper, the author would like to note the 
following three points.  
First, the pattern under which the situation unfolded—where, in the 
absence of a consensus among the Japanese authorities, some organizations 
ventured to cultivate contacts with and support a group of Vietnamese 
nationalists at their own discretion, and ended up having their efforts 
overturned by the mainstream faction in the government and the 
military–was by no means limited to the occasion of the Japanese advance 
into northern French Indochina in 1940. Much the same pattern was 
repeated in the Japanese involvement in local politics around the time of 
the March 1945 anti-French coup staged by the Japanese army.136 In this 
sense, the full story of the Phuc Quoc Army foreshadowed Japan’s 
                                                  
136 Since the writing of the Japanese original version of this paper, the author has published 
Shiraishi (1982) and Shiraishi (1984) to analyze this point. 
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subsequent policy toward nationalist movements of Vietnam. In fact, the 
pattern where military leaders and organizations at various levels held 
divergent opinions, and where conflicting interests and claims in the 
superior organs were passed down to the bottom units without consensus 
and official approval by the decision makers of the higher echelon, 
essentially remained unchanged between the time of the advance into 
northern Indochina and after. 
 Second, with regard to the effects of the Phuc Quoc force’s 
unsuccessful insurrection on the later development of politics in Vietnam, 
the surviving members, who withdrew into the Guangxi area, seem to have 
subsequently become important targets for the recruiting activities of the 
pro-Kuomintang Vietnamese and the Viet Minh forces. Given the strategic 
importance of this area of China, which bordered on Vietnam, for the 
Vietnamese nationalist movement, an endeavor to trace the subsequent 
trajectory followed by former members of the Phuc Quoc Army seems to be 
worthwhile in its own right. At the same time, the Phuc Quoc Army’s 
insurrection in Dong Dang and Lang Son seems to have given some impetus, 
directly or indirectly, to the Bac Son uprising of late 1940 staged under the 
leadership of the Indochinese Communist Party.137 Examinations should be 
made into the relationship, if any, between the two incidents. 
 Third, insofar as the failure of the Phuc Quoc Army was caused, 
objectively speaking, by the Japanese “betrayal,” some words must be said 
about its repercussions on the subsequent political situation in Vietnam.  
                                                  
137 Concerning the Bac Son uprising, see Ban Nghien Cuu Lich Su Dang Khu Tu Tri Viet Bac 
(1975); Yoshizawa Minami (1971). 
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To begin with, the failure of the Phuc Quoc Army must have had a 
devastating impact on the Phuc Quoc League’s subsequent activities among 
Vietnamese in exile in China. From the outset, it was in essence the 
Guangzhou group alone, among the various groups of Vietnamese in China, 
that took part in the launching of the League (along with a group in Siam, 
and several participants who seem to have joined from Hong Kong after the 
inaugural meeting). Other groups in China appear to have been 
uninterested in, or unsympathetic toward, Cuong De’s pro-Japanese stance. 
It is reasonable to assume that after the failure of the insurrection, Cuong 
De must have found it all the more difficult to win the support of his 
compatriots. The activities of Vietnamese in the interior of China seem to 
have increasingly converged into a leadership struggle, especially in the 
China-Vietnam border areas, between groups close to the Kuomintang and 
those affiliated with the Viet Minh. 
 Having lost their foothold among their Vietnamese compatriots in 
China, Cuong De and his group switched their attention to developing 
contacts with various groups within Vietnam.  
Then, what were the repercussions of the Phuc Quoc Army’s armed 
insurrection and its failure on the political situation inside Vietnam? In fact, 
it is not easy to give adequate answers to this question, since the French 
Indochinese authorities imposed a strict blackout on news about the 
insurrection.138 Local newspapers both in Vietnamese and in French gave 
extensive coverage to the incident of the Japanese crossing of the borders, 
                                                  
138 It was not until December 13, 1940, that French Governor-General of Indochina Jean Decoux 
openly acknowledged that the insurrection actually took place. Tôa Kenkyûjo ed. (1943) p. 682. 
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but remained completely silent on the Phuc Quoc insurrection. Of course, it 
is very conceivable that, despite the authorities’ strict control, some related 
information might have spread among Vietnamese people by word of 
mouth.139 Among the intellectuals who had been in Hanoi and Saigon at the 
time and who answered the author’s interviews, however, not a few testified 
that they knew nothing about the Phuc Quoc Army’s insurrection at the 
time.140 
 The author, therefore, can not give a direct answer concerning the 
repercussions of the Phuc Quoc Army’s failure, but instead will confine 
himself to commenting briefly about the effect of Japan’s French 
Indochinese policy in 1940-41 and, in more general terms, upon political 
developments in Vietnam.  
Following their advance into northern Indochina in September 1940, 
the Japanese concluded an agreement with the French for the “joint 
defense” of Indochina in July 1941 and peacefully entered the southern part 
of the French colony. Then, at the start of the Pacific War in December 1941, 
they decided to keep their existing policy toward French Indochina 
unchanged.  
This fact had two implications for internal Vietnamese politics. First, 
Japanese forces were stationed permanently in Vietnam, and this was 
naturally accompanied by an increasing Japanese political and economic 
                                                  
139 Interviews with Prof. Hoang Xuan Han; and Dr. Ho Ta Khanh. 
140 The French Indochinese authorities repeatedly issued a notice on September 24, September 27, 
and November 19 advising people “not to listen to groundless rumors.” See Dong Phap 
newspaper (published in Hanoi), September 25 and 27, 1940; and Tôa Kenkyûjo ed (1943) p. 
678. The October 3 and 4, 1940 issues of Dong Phap also reported that the French Indochinese 
authorities were trying to control communications between the Lang Son area and elsewhere. 
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presence there. Second, the Japanese advance was carried out with the 
status quo in French Indochina unchanged, that is to say, with the French 
colonial administration intact.   
It may be possible to say that the first factor proved instrumental in 
bringing into place the objective conditions necessary for the Japanese 
authorities and civilians, and the group of Vietnamese nationalists in Japan, 
including Cuong De, to make contact with various groups inside Vietnam or 
to recruit supporters of Japan. On the other hand, the second factor–that 
despite its proclamation of working toward the “liberation of Greater East 
Asia,” Japan gave approval to the continued existence of the French colonial 
administration–led Vietnamese to question Japan’s sincerity.  
In fact, Cuong De himself, in his autobiography which he is reported 
to have dictated in 1943, expressed his own sense of distrust toward Japan 
in the following, rather carefully restrained terms: the policy of “joint 
defense” and “economic cooperation” between Japan and French Indochina 
was only a temporary one, and Japan in the near future would realize 
“pan-Asianism,” leaving no country in East Asia under (Western) colonial 
rule; only then would the reality come into agreement with the “axiom”; so 
long as the ongoing “Greater East Asian War” was aimed at liberating all 
East Asian nations from the oppression of the Europeans, the Vietnamese, 
who constituted one of the East Asian nations, had the obligation to bring 
this war to victory in cooperation with the Japanese.141 
In a pamphlet which the Phuc Quoc League circulated in Vietnam at 
                                                  
141 CD, pp. 139-140. 
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the time (which is kept in the Archives in France), Cuong De addressed his 
compatriots as follows: he himself was also aware that many people in 
Vietnam were dissatisfied with Japan’s policy toward French Indochina; but 
in the near future, Japan would change this policy, realizing its aim of East 
Asian liberation in Vietnam as well.”142 
These documents reveal his dissatisfaction with Japan’s policy of 
maintaining the status quo in French Indochina, which impeded his group’s 
effort to win Vietnamese support for the Phuc Quoc League. Nonetheless, 
there is no denying that Cuong De remained under Japanese protection to 
the end, continued to play the role of a Japanese “puppet”. 
 In brief, the emergence of pro-Japanese groups within Vietnam and 
their participation in or merger with the Phuc Quoc League were realized 
on the basis of a balance between the two above-mentioned factors, namely, 
the increasing military, political, and economic presence of Japan in 
Vietnam, and the strong sense of distrust (or weak sense of trust) toward 
Japan harbored by the Vietnamese people. 
 
 
Postscript: The author would like to express his heartfelt gratitude to all 
those who kindly granted interviews to the author, and to many of the 
participants of the following meetings for their invaluable comments.  
                                                  
142 A propaganda pamphlet published by the Phuc Quoc League in Tôkyô on September 26, 1941, 
co-signed by Cuong De, Chairman of the League for National Restoration of Vietnam, and Le 
Nam, Secretary General of the Central Executive Committee. The pamphlet is found in the file, 
“Papiers Decoux,” housed in the Archives Nationales, Section Outre-Mer (in Paris, now 
relocated in Aix-en-Provence). 
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Glossary of Vietnamese, Japanese and Chinese Names 
 
 
A. Places  
 
Amakusa? ?? 
Bắc Sơn 
Beijing? ?? 
Chongqing? ?? 
Đồ Sơn 
Đồng Đăng 
Fujian? ?? 
Guangzhou? ?? 
Guangdong? ?? 
Guangxi? ?? 
Hải Phòng 
Hainan Island? ??? 
Hankou? ?? 
Hangzhou? ?? 
Hà Nội 
Hong Kong? ?? 
Huế 
Hunan? ?? 
Koishikawa Ward? ???? 
Kumamoto Prefecture (Ken)? ??? 
Lạng Sơn 
Lukow-kiao? ??? 
Luoyang? ?? 
Kowloon? ?? 
Macao 
Nanpô? ?? 
Nanjing? ?? 
Nanning? ?? 
Qinzhou Bay? ??? 
Sài Gòn 
Shanghai? ?? 
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Tôkyô? ?? 
Ômori Ward? ??? 
Sakura Jôsui? ??? 
Taipei? ?? 
Tianjin? ?? 
Wuhan? ?? 
Zhejiang? ?? 
 
 
B. Persons 
 
Chí Điền  ?? would be Shida 
Chin Ki-Sei? ???? ?? Trần Huy Thánh  
Cường Để  
Đặng Ngọc Châu 
Đặng Nguyên Hùng  
Đặng Sư Mặc 
Điền Thôn  ?? would be Tamura 
Đỗ Khải Hoàn  
Duan Qirui? ??? 
Dương Bá Trạc 
Đường Văn Thu  
Fukushima Yasumasa? ???? 
Giáp Ngọc Minh 
Gondô Masatake? ???? 
Gamada? could be ?? 
Hayashi Yoshihide? ??? 
Hồ Học Lãm, or Hồ Ngọc Lãm 
Hòa Chi, Hòa Chí or Hòa Tri, Hòa Trí  ?? Wachi Yôji  
Hoàng Bình 
Hoàng Lương 
Hoàng Nam Hùng 
Inukai Takeru? ??? 
Inukai Tsuyoshi? ??? 
Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek)? ???  
Kadomatsu Shôichi? ???? 
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Kashiwabara Buntarô? ????? 
Komatsu Kiyoshi? ??? 
Konoe Ayamaro? ???? 
Lê Kiên 
Lê Nam 
Lê Toàn 
Lê Trung 
Lin De Shun  ???  ?? Rin Toku Jun in Japanese pronunciation 
Mai Văn Thông 
Masui Jun’ichi? ???? 
Matsui Iwane? ???? 
Matsubayashi? ??? ?? Tùng Lâm in Vietnamese pronunciation 
Minami Kazuo? ??? 
Muta Hanako? could be ???? 
Nakai Masutarô? ????? 
Nakano Hidemitsu? ???? 
Ngô Đình Diệm 
Ngô Phương Chính? ??? 
Nguyễn Đại Khã  
Nguyễn Hải Thần  ?? Vũ Hải Thu 
Nguyễn Rinh Nhiếp 
Nguyễn Thế Nghiệp 
Nguyễn Thức Canh  ?  Trần Hữu Công 
Nguyễn Văn Trung 
Nguyễn Xuân Chữ 
Nishihara Issaku? ???? 
Nishihara Mitsugu? ??? 
Nông Quốc Long 
Ohana? ??  ?? a conventional appellation or nickname for Muta Hanako 
Ôkawa Shûmei? ???? 
Ômiya Komaki? ????? 
Phạm Hồng Thái  
Phan Bội Châu 
Phan Thúc Ngô  
Phan Trọng Đoan 
Shida? ??? ?? Chí Điền in Vietnamese pronunciation 
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Takamatsu? would be?? 
Tản Anh 
Tamura? ??? Điền Thôn 
Tominaga Kyôji? ???? 
Tôyama Mitsuru? ??? 
Trần Bội Long 
Trần Hữu Công  ?  Nguyễn Thức Canh, and Trần Trọng Khắc  
Trần Huy Liệu 
Trần Huy Thánh? ?? Chin Ki-Sei (in Japanese), and Trần Văn An 
Trần Hy Thánh  ?? Trần Huy Thánh  
Trần Minh Đức 
Trần Phúc An  ?? Trần Văn An, and Trần Huy Thánh 
Trần Quang Vinh 
Trần Trọng Khắc  ?? Trần Hữu Công, and Nguyễn Thức Canh 
Trần Trung Lập? ??? 
Trần Văn An  ?  Trần Huy Thánh 
Trần Văn Ân 
Tráng Liệt, 
Trung-Giả Anh-Phú, or Trung Dã a Anh Quang  ?  Nakano Hidemitsu  
Trương An Mẫn 
Trương Bữu Lâm  
Tùng Lâm  ?  Matsubayashi 
Ujihara Susumu? ??? 
Võ Đình Dy  
Vũ Hải Thu  ?? Nguyễn Hải Thần  
Vũ Hồng Khanh 
Wachi Yôji? ????  
Wang Jingwei? ??? 
Wang Kemin? ??? 
Wang Zhaoming? ??? 
Yamane Dôichi? ???? 
Yazaki Kanjû? ???? 
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C. Organizations and Others 
 
Ajia Renmei? ?????? Asian League  
Betonamu-go Hôsô-han? ??????? Vietnamese Broadcasting Team (in Taipei) 
Cao Đài (religious sect) 
Dai-go Shidan? ????? The Fifth Division 
Dai-hachi-Ka? ???? Section Eight (usually called Bôryaku-ka? ???? Covert Operations 
Section) of the Army General Staff Office  in Tôkyô 
Dai-ichi-Bu? ???? The First Department (usually called Sakusen-bu? ???? Military 
Strategies and Operations Department) of the Army General Staff Office in Tôkyô 
Dainan Kôshi? ????? Dainan Corporation 
Dai-ni Chûka Gakusha? ??????? Second Dormitory for Chinese Students 
Dai-nijûichi Gun? ????? The 21st Army (in Guangdong)  
Dai-nijûni Gun? ????? The 22nd Army (in Guangxi) 
Đại Việt Phục Quốc Độc Lập Quân? ???????? Independence Army for the National 
Restoration of Great Viet  
Đông Du Movement  Phong trào Đông Du? ????? Movement for Studying Abroad in Japan 
Đông Dương Cộng Sản Đảng? ?????? Indochinese Communist Party 
Futsuin Kokkyô Kanshidan? ???????? French Indochinese Border Monitoring Body  ? 
Nishihara Kikan  
Guangdong ?Kanton?Tokumu Kikan? ??????? Guangdong Special Service Agency  
Gyôchisha? ???? Gyochi Society 
Hoa Nam Văn Hóa Hiệp Hội? ??????? South China Cultural Association 
Indoshina Chûton-Gun? ???????? Indochina Stationary Force 
Indoshina Haken-Gun? ???????? Indochina Expeditionary Force  
Jôhô-Ka? ???? Information Section (of the Government-General of Taiwan) 
Kagesa Agency (Kikan)? ???? 
Kisaragi-Kai? ???? February Society 
Kokuryû-Kai? ???? Black Dragon Society 
Kuomintang? ?????? Chinese Nationalist Party 
Matsubara Hotel? ????? 
Matsushita Mitsuhiro? ???? 
Mejiro Middle School? ???? 
Minami-Shina Hômen-Gun? ??????? South China Theatre Force 
Nishihara Kikan? ????? Nishihara Mission? ?? Futsuin Kokkyô Kanshidan 
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Okada? ?? 
Ran Kikan? ???? Orchid Agency 
Rekisen Primary School? ????? 
Rikugun Shikan-Gakkô? ??????? Army Academy 
Sakusen-Bu? ??? and Sakusen-Ka? ???? Department and Section for Military Strategies 
and Operations of the Army General Staff Office in Tôkyô.  ?? See also Dai-ichi-Bu 
Sanbô-Honbu? ????? the Army General Staff Office in Tôkyô 
Seiji-Keizai-Ka Senmon-bu ? ????????? whose literal translation would be the 
Specialized Course of Department of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University 
(?????) 
Seijo Chûgaku? ????? Seijo Middle School 
Shanghai Dôbun Shoin? ??????? Shanghai School of Same Letters 
Shina Haken-Gun? ?????? China Expeditionary Force 
Shinbu Gakkô? ????? Shimbu Military School 
Taiwan Sôtokufu? ?????? Government-General of Taiwan 
Taiwan Takushoku Kaisha? ??????? Taiwan Colonization Corporation 
Teikoku-Daigaku Igakubu? ???????? Medical School of Imperial University 
Tôkyô Dôbun Shoin? ??????? Tôkyô School of Same Letters  
Tôkyô Kôtô Shihan Gakkô? ????????? Tôkyô Higher Normal School 
Việt Minh? ??? stands for Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội? ????????  
? ? ? ? League for the Independence of Vietnam 
Việt Nam Cách Mạng Đồng Chí Hội? ???????? Society of Comrades for the  
Revolution of Vietnam 
Việt Nam Cách Mạng Đồng Minh Hội? ???????? League for the Revolution of  
? ? ? ? Vietnam 
Việt Nam Độc Lập Vận Động Đồng Minh Hội? ?????????? League for the  
Independence Movement of Vietnam) 
Việt Nam Duy Tân Hội? ?????? Society for the Renovation of Vietnam 
Việt Nam Kiến Quốc Quân? ?????? Nation-Building Army of Vietnam 
Việt Nam Phục Quốc Đồng Minh Hội? ???????? League for the National Restoration of 
Vietnam 
Việt Nam Phục Quốc Hội? ?????? Society for the National Restoration of Vietnam 
Việt Nam Phục Quốc Quân? ?????? National Restoration Army of Vietnam 
Việt Nam Quang Phục Hội? ?????? Society for the Revival of Vietnam 
Việt Nam Quốc Dân Cách Mạng Đảng? ???????? Vietnamese National 
 Revolutionary Party 
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Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng? ?????? Vietnamese Nationalist Party 
Việt Nam Trung Ương Chấp Hành Ủy Viên Hội? ?????????? Central Executive 
Committee of Vietnam 
Waseda University? ????? 
Xin Xin Hotel  ????  ?  Tân Tân Hotel in Vietnamese pronunciation 
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and then as Major of the Shanghai Military Police from March 1938 to February 
1942, and as Staff Officer, then as Military Police Lieutenant Colonel, and 
subsequently as Military Police Colonel of the Indochina Stationary Force 
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